Combinatory logic
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Newberry - 25 Dec 2008 18:48 GMT Hi, here is a quote from this website
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/nonstbib.htm#combinatory
>> Combinatory logic Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of arithmetic built from combinatory logic can contain all partial recursive functions and avoid Gödel incompleteness. <<
Is the last statement true?
herbzet - 26 Dec 2008 17:00 GMT > Hi, here is a quote from this website > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Is the last statement true? I don't know, but I can tell you that the first reference
Curry, Haskell B. Combinatory Logic. Vol. 1 by Curry and R. Feys; vol. 2 by Curry, J.R. Hindley, and J.P. Seldin. North-Holland, 1958, 1972.
is way-crazy technical, starting on page 2. Don't bother.
The other two references I hadn't heard of, might be worth looking at.
-- hz
Jack Campin - bogus address - 27 Dec 2008 23:26 GMT >>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify >>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of >>: arithmetic built from combinatory logic can contain all partial >>: recursive functions and avoid Gödel incompleteness. >> Is the last statement true? Yes, but their deductive system is incomplete (basically you have to do everything by equational reasoning; adding modus ponens leads to inconsistency, see the appendix on illative combinatory logic in Barendregt's book). You lose more than you gain.
> I don't know, but I can tell you that the first reference > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > The other two references I hadn't heard of, might be worth looking at. The easiest intro is Hindley and Seldin, _Introduction to Combinators and {\lambda}-calculus_. Anything beyond that and "you start turning into a Dutchman" as somebody I forget once put it to me.
If you want to try doing an approximation to Hilbert's programme with something like a combinatory logic, the typed systems get you normal mathematics more easily (i.e. you can measure the strength of the system in a fairly standard way, rather than being completely in the dark about how strong your system is or even whether it's consistent). The Calculus of Constructions is one of the more powerful versions.
==== j a c k at c a m p i n . m e . u k === <http://www.campin.me.uk> ==== Jack Campin, 11 Third St, Newtongrange EH22 4PU, Scotland == mob 07800 739 557 CD-ROMs and free stuff: Scottish music, food intolerance, and Mac logic fonts
herbzet - 28 Dec 2008 02:53 GMT > >>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify > >>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > to inconsistency, see the appendix on illative combinatory logic in > Barendregt's book). You lose more than you gain. Do you mean
The Lambda Calculus, Its Syntax and Semantics [1984] Vol. 103 in Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics North-Holland
?
> > I don't know, but I can tell you that the first reference > > [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > dark about how strong your system is or even whether it's consistent). > The Calculus of Constructions is one of the more powerful versions. Thanks for your response, especially the reference!
-- hz
Jack Campin - bogus address - 28 Dec 2008 11:54 GMT >>>>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify >>>>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > Vol. 103 in Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics > North-Holland Yes.
There are other small introductory books besides Hindley & Seldin but they aren't all that useful. Stenlund's (on the typed lambda calculus and its connection with intuitionistic proof theory) is very clear for what it does but has nothing to say about this foundational stuff. Fitch's monograph "Elements of Combinatory Logic" is a straightforward attempt to do meaningful mathematics in such a system, but he doesn't back up his metatheoretic claims for it - it's so different from other combinatory systems that none of the standard soundness results (the Church-Rosser theorem or semantic models) directly apply to it. I wouldn't be at all surprised if it had been proven inconsistent.
I'm not sure if there is any treatment of combinatory logic as a foundational system (i.e. illative combinatory logic) that goes much further than Seldin's Ph.D. thesis. And it isn't at all clear to me what you end up with in that, in mathematical terms. Can you do enough inductive reasoning to prove unique factorization for natural numbers? Prove an analogue of the Mean Value Theorem? - it may be folklore in Amsterdam what the payoff is, but it sure isn't visible to me.
==== j a c k at c a m p i n . m e . u k === <http://www.campin.me.uk> ==== Jack Campin, 11 Third St, Newtongrange EH22 4PU, Scotland == mob 07800 739 557 CD-ROMs and free stuff: Scottish music, food intolerance, and Mac logic fonts
herbzet - 28 Dec 2008 14:02 GMT > >>>>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify > >>>>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of [quoted text clipped - 31 lines] > may be folklore in Amsterdam what the payoff is, but it sure isn't > visible to me. Somehow, I think that "ain't" was really wanted in your peroration.
-- hz
Jan Burse - 29 Dec 2008 00:11 GMT Jack Campin - bogus address schrieb:
> There are other small introductory books besides Hindley & Seldin but > they aren't all that useful. Stenlund's (on the typed lambda calculus > and its connection with intuitionistic proof theory) is very clear for > what it does but has nothing to say about this foundational stuff. If I remember well, Hindley & Seldin waste a lot of time which some looping issues in reduction, which was meanwhile solved in the prepositional case by Dragalin....
A nice, and I would say even introductory book, is the following: Sorensen & Urzyczyn: Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, Studies in Logic, Volume 149, 2006
> Fitch's monograph "Elements of Combinatory Logic" is a straightforward > attempt to do meaningful mathematics in such a system, but he doesn't > back up his metatheoretic claims for it - it's so different from other > combinatory systems that none of the standard soundness results (the > Church-Rosser theorem or semantic models) directly apply to it. I > wouldn't be at all surprised if it had been proven inconsistent. Did not yet get hold of this one.
Bye
Newberry - 28 Dec 2008 16:39 GMT On Dec 27, 3:26 pm, Jack Campin - bogus address <bo...@purr.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify > >>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > to inconsistency, see the appendix on illative combinatory logic in > Barendregt's book). You lose more than you gain. What do you mean incomplete? OK, so they leave out modus ponens. Does it make the system incomplete? Modus ponens cannot be used in t- relevant logic either.
> > I don't know, but I can tell you that the first reference > [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > Jack Campin, 11 Third St, Newtongrange EH22 4PU, Scotland == mob 07800 739 557 > CD-ROMs and free stuff: Scottish music, food intolerance, and Mac logic fonts george - 29 Dec 2008 00:44 GMT On Dec 27, 6:26 pm, Jack Campin - bogus address <bo...@purr.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> Yes, but their deductive system is incomplete (basically you have > to do everything by equational reasoning; adding modus ponens leads > to inconsistency, see the appendix on illative combinatory logic in > Barendregt's book). You lose more than you gain. That perspective does not seem to be shared by the following reference:
>> Henk Barendregt, Martin Bunder, and Wil Dekker >> J. Symbolic Logic Volume 58, Issue 3 (1993), 769-788. Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate calculus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators or, in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way.
>> The two direct translations turn out to be complete.
>> The paper fulfills the program of Church [1932], [1933] and Curry [1930] to base >> logic on a consistent system of $\lambda$-terms or combinators. Hitherto this >> program had failed because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a
>> sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even inconsistent). Jan Burse - 29 Dec 2008 01:06 GMT george schrieb:
> ... illetative logic ... The logic is subject to explosion, see: http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/2066/17259/1/13276.pdf
Proposition 1.4
Bye
Jan Burse - 29 Dec 2008 01:18 GMT Jan Burse schrieb:
> george schrieb: > [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > > Bye Oops, no there is some trick with a new operator H, to avoid that. Oki Doki.
But anyway. We should recall church hypothesis, which says that partial recursive, turning machines and lambda calculus have the same strength!
So when somebody comes and tells you that combinatory logic can do more ... I wouldn't buy that ...
The reasons for combinatory logic should be found somewhere else. Here is my penny of thought, which follows directly from the Howard-Curry Isomorphism:
- They are attractive because they offer a medium to represent propositions and proofs (sic!).
Bye
Newberry - 29 Dec 2008 05:54 GMT > Jan Burse schrieb: > [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > So when somebody comes and tells you that combinatory > logic can do more ... I wouldn't buy that ... Who said that combinatory logic could do more?
> The reasons for combinatory logic should be found > somewhere else. Here is my penny of thought, which [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > Bye george - 29 Dec 2008 00:56 GMT On Dec 27, 6:26 pm, Jack Campin - bogus address <bo...@purr.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >>: Logics that replace variables with functions in order to clarify > >>: intuitive operations on variables such as substitution. Systems of > >>: arithmetic built from combinatory logic can contain all partial > >>: recursive functions and avoid Gödel incompleteness. > >> Is the last statement true? NO. NOTHING CAN "avoid Godel incompleteness" if it is strong enough for the question to be relevant. That is what Godel's theorem proves!
> Yes, but their deductive system is incomplete The following reference is also Barendregt et al, and it is complete (at least intuitionistically): http://www.jstor.org/pss/2275096
Newberry - 29 Dec 2008 05:55 GMT > On Dec 27, 6:26 pm, Jack Campin - bogus address > [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > enough for the question to be relevant. > That is what Godel's theorem proves! Goedel's theorem does not even come close. It proves it for classical logix + Peano axioms and certain generalizations. I do not know that combinatory logic falls within those generalizations.
> > Yes, but their deductive system is incomplete > > The following reference is also Barendregt et al, > and it is complete (at least intuitionistically):http://www.jstor.org/pss/2275096 george - 29 Dec 2008 20:20 GMT > > NO. NOTHING CAN > > "avoid Godel incompleteness" if it is strong > > enough for the question to be relevant. > > That is what Godel's theorem proves! > > Goedel's theorem does not even come close. You're Just Wrong. It completely settles the issue.
> It proves it for classical > logix + Peano axioms and certain generalizations. It proves it for ALL generalizations that are relevant. Please! You need to think of this as analogous to the Universal Generalization inference rule. It essentiall proves it for AN ARBITRARY system. Yes, in PA, you have to use the Chinese Remainder theorem, but THAT IS NOT the point! The point IS that the result NECESSARILY holds FOR ANY system IN WHICH YOU CAN DO ARITHMETIC, i.e., IN WHICH YOU CAN REPRESENT the system's own provablilty predicate!
> I do not know that > combinatory logic falls within those generalizations. ANYthing worthy of the name of "logic" would HAVE to fall within them. YES, OBVIOUSLY, IF you can reprsent ANY lambda- definable function, THEN OF COURSE you can represent the proof- predicate; proof-predicates ARE PRIMITIVE-recursive!
And you (worse) said "fall within" as though you were trying to LIMIT the power of the system! It is precisely systems that Are MORE powerful than Peano Arithmetic that MUST (in virtue of that EXTRA power) be incomplete! It is systems that are LESS powerful that might THEREfore hope to be complete (in the sense of being able to decide all their sentences). So what you MEANT to say was that you were not sure whether combinatory logic WAS ADEQUATE to those generalizations, whether it LIVED UP TO those generalizations, NOT whether it "Fell within" them!
Combinators ARE NOT logic in any standard sense ANYway -- they are TERM-REWRITING and reduction -- they are all about TERMS AS OPPOSED to predicates or statements. Even creating a SENTENCE (even an EQUATION!) out of combinators AT ALL is HARD and UNnatural! What NATURALLY happens with combinators is reduction or evaluation, and THAT tragically happens in a language BEYOND that of combinators: Kxy reduces to x, but "reduces to" is NOT a combinator! More to the point, what is ACTUALLY MEANT here (in standard classical FOL) is Axy[ ((Kx)y)=x ], and "=" is NOT a combinator either, and Axy[ ] is NOT a combinator EITHER! Finally, since you have to write the axiom "Sxyz reduces to xz(yz)" WITH embedded parentheses, you face the problem that "(" IS NOT A COMBINATOR EITHER.
This whole paradigm is so completely different from the standard classical one that even TRYING to bridge the gap is a waste of time. But that does NOT change ANYthing about Godel's Theorem. Godel's Theorem is VERY absolute. It is a property of things with a certain POWER, a certain STRENGTH, in the realm of definability. So it ABSOLUTELY NEVER matters whether the system is made of terms, predicates, combinators, sets, graphs, fool's gold, green cheese, or flying pigs: ALL that matters is HOW STRONG its powers of definition are. If they are strong enough then Godel's Theorem PROVES that they are not complete. If you can say "I am not provable" in the system, then NO MATTER WHAT it's made of, Godel's Theorem MUST apply.
The proof that Godel's theorem applies to combinators is actually the so-called "paradoxical combinator" or (less pejoratively) "fixed-point combinator", usually defined Y, which can return a fixed-point for ANY function, (Yf=f(Yf) for all f), INCLUDING both negation and unprovability, which is obviously inconsistent if you have completeness. It is also relevant for proving that you can have recursive function definitions, which essentially means TM-equivalent power.
Here is a reference that I am sorry I could not quote: http://books.google.com/books?id=7QQ5u-4tRUkC&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=%22paradoxical +combinator%22+fixed+point+Y+incompleteness&source=bl&ots=PmeSeIe69q&sig=sUUtObB 2tfc97MU6YOe-RIEtIYQ&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result#PPA71,M1
Jan Burse - 29 Dec 2008 00:37 GMT Newberry schrieb:
> Hi, here is a quote from this website > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Is the last statement true? There are some combinatory logic system that can do an awful lot ... and ... are inconsistent.
See Girard's paradox. System U and U- are inconsistent. The result is also found here:
Sorensen & Urzyczyn: Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, Studies in Logic, Volume 149, 2006 14.6.5 Theorem Girard's paradox.
Otherwise I think Gödels incompletness theorem carries over to combinatory systems.
And what Mr. Suber writes is non-sense. Because arithmetic already contains all partial recursive functions.
Primitive recursive functions use a bounded quantifiers, whereas partial recursive functions use unbounded quantifiers.
Arithmetic even contains more than partial functions, the whole arithmetic hierarchy...
Bye
george - 29 Dec 2008 01:11 GMT > Hi, here is a quote from this website > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Is the last statement true? No. Even the wikipedia article knows that much! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combinatory_logic#Undecidability_of_combinatorial_c alculus Of course, this is "incompleteness" in a very unusual sense, namely, the ability to decide whether an arbitrary combinator does or doesn't eventually reduce to something basic. There is also an analogue of Rice's Theorem that says, basically, that trying to use combinators as predicates is guaranteed to yield incompleteness.
Jan Burse - 29 Dec 2008 01:21 GMT george schrieb:
>> Is the last statement true? > > No. > Even the wikipedia article knows that much! > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combinatory_logic#Undecidability_of_combinatorial_c alculus Thanks george. So the conclusion is: What is written before the "and" in the last statement is nonsense, and what is written after the "and" in the last statement is nonsensen.
Bye
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