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Math Forum / Mathematics / Mathematical Logic / July 2009Does the World have parts, objects, and relationships?
A RIDICULOUS IDEA? I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically convenient fictions, and that they are, instead, descriptions of a whole. By "relationships" I refer to the relationships of objects, behaviours, temporal sequence of events, etc. There are no objects in the world. The world has no "parts". There are no objects or parts because we only ever see a whole, and a whole is not countable. A whole is not countable because there are no other points of reference to make a count possible. Is this a ridiculous idea? Not really. We all take things at a glance. When we talk about objects, and include "this object" with "that object" then the description we give of "these objects" is always a description of a whole. If we assign numbers to the objects then we don't make these objects part of a set or part of a collection. We merely elaborate, with each count, the grammatical possibilities of expressing the whole. FOR THE LOGICIAN For the logicians, it means that all logical propositions, functions, sets, the elements of sets, variables, etc., are atomic facts, propositions or objects, incommensurable and not subject to relationship. As all logical symbols are "wholes" an atomic fact or object is, therefore, the simplest description of a whole. As Wittgensteinian's know "aRb" does not say that a and b are in the relationship R, it shows, rather, "That "a" stands to "b" in a certain relation says that aRb." (Tractatus, 3.1432) Copi thinks that Wittgenstein is here indicating that there are two ingredients in aRb. Hintikka thinks that there are three, that R is an object. But I say that there are no ingredients or objects in this relationship. Wittgenstein is here using the term "relationship" as the name of an uncountable whole. To then talk about parts or ingredients is to present a description of a different whole. FINALLY, AN EXAMPLE Before the example, I give, as further description of my point, wholes are incommensurable, emergent, and not constituted of parts or objects. Parts and objects do not subsist in their own right, they are grammatical possibilities of the whole. Parts and objects are different grammatical descriptions of a whole. Now, every time we create an object, or refer to an an object, we create a whole. A relationship, an object, and a part, are ways of describing, introducing, or speaking about a whole. If the umbrella is in the hallway, then there is not a hallway and an umbrella in relationship, there is a whole state of affairs "umbrella in the hallway" that bears no relationship to its supposed "parts". > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? Yep. A rock is an object, not an idea or a relationship.  SignatureEnkidu AA#2165 EAC Chaplain and ordained minister, ULC, Modesto, CA "Calling Atheism a religion is like calling bald a hair color." --Don Hirschberg > > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > "Calling Atheism a religion is like calling bald a hair color." > --Don Hirschberg If you want to get particularly philosophical about this (and a wee bit pedantic), it can be said that a rock is a relationship of its component parts (including any flora or fauna that exist on or subsist from it) and their component molecules and atoms. A rock also exists in relationship to its geographical surroundings: it's part of a field, mountain, rock formation, or other structure. From a metaphysical approach, a rock also exist in relation to its temporal- spatial environment for the duration of its "rockness." >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > >Yep. A rock is an object, not an idea or a relationship. That is not what he was saying though. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically > convenient fictions, and that they are, instead, descriptions of a > whole. Wholes are also grammatically convenient fictions. > FINALLY, AN EXAMPLE > Before the example I love the juxtaposition here. Marshall > > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically > > convenient fictions, and that they are, instead, descriptions of a > > whole. > > Wholes are also grammatically convenient fictions. Exactly! On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback <shrikeback@gmail.com> in <a5d8d6e1-1cbe-47a8-ad4a-4cf0ef47c38e@d9g2000prh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >> > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > >Exactly! Beat me to it. Yes, there is just stuff. We have names we use to point to things so we can communicate about stuff, we see various similarities allowing us to use the same name to point to different stuff, but none of that means that the stuff is distinct from other stuff nor that a thing *has* parts. Parts, wholes, relationships, those are all things we name to communicate about the world. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback > <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > stuff nor that a thing *has* parts. Parts, wholes, relationships, > those are all things we name to communicate about the world. The phrase "grammatically convenient fiction" suggests that the world does not dictate our choices. But the world clearly and rudely does. Perhaps an "unrealism" is being wrongly promoted here? Signaturedorayme >> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback >> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 19 lines] >The phrase "grammatically convenient fiction" suggests that the world >does not dictate our choices. I don't know why it suggests that to you, it does not suggest it to me. Words are maps and maps are not territories. They are fictions, some useful, some not. > But the world clearly and rudely does. >Perhaps an "unrealism" is being wrongly promoted here? Perhaps, but it is not my intent to propose that. I have know idea what JJ thinks though. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > >> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback > >> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 23 lines] > me. Words are maps and maps are not territories. They are fictions, > some useful, some not. Words are fictions? You have lost me. There are natural kinds of things that are different to the sort of artificially convenient categories that folk can sometimes cook up for this or that purpose. Humans do not have a word for lions or animals merely because there are c"convenient fictions" here but rather because there are lions and animals and they are too obvious not to have words for. If you like there are various levels of convenience and to throw tall words that name things into the same boat is to miss the significant differences in how much influence the world itself sometimes makes on us. In other words, there are some categorizations that speak for a subjectivity and there are some that speak for an objectivity. Signaturedorayme >> >> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback >> >> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 25 lines] > >Words are fictions? You have lost me. OK, words are signs, pointers, they are stand-ins for the thing referenced. They are not the thing talked about and so are, in that sense lies, fictions. >There are natural kinds I am not at all sure about that. Seriously. If you want we can have a discussion on whether or not there are natural kinds. >of things that are different to the sort of >artificially convenient categories that folk can sometimes cook up for >this or that purpose. Humans do not have a word for lions or animals >merely because there are c"convenient fictions" here but rather because >there are lions and animals and they are too obvious not to have words >for. Of course there is stuff we point to. The *words* are the fictions, not the stuff they refer to. Or, to be a bit more clear, the words, in use, are fictions. >If you like there are various levels of convenience and to throw tall >words that name things into the same boat is to miss the significant >differences in how much influence the world itself sometimes makes on >us. I am not in any way denying that the world influences us. (Except that your construction implies a distinction between us and the world that I think is false and troublesome. We are in the world and of the world, not simply influenced by the world.) >In other words, there are some categorizations that speak for a >subjectivity and there are some that speak for an objectivity. Perhaps, but certainly irrelevant to my point. Words denote, some of the denotation is utterly wrong, some is as good as we can get, some is true/false from a POV (subjective), some is universally true/false (objective). But words are not the things referred to. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" ... > >Words are fictions? You have lost me. > > OK, words are signs, pointers, they are stand-ins for the thing > referenced. They are not the thing talked about and so are, in that > sense lies, fictions. I hate to be awkward, (but it seems I can't help it, I have spoken to my doc about it but we just argue... <g>) but there seems no obvious or natural sense in which words are fictions? Of course, they can be used where they fail to refer and they can be used to paint false pictures. Perhaps you are just pointing to that sentences can be false and that words can fail to refer either accidentally or helplessly or deliberately. But why would you be wanting to point that out? But it is OK, I can imagine that any conversation with JJ might need the most basic things pointing out. > >There are natural kinds > > I am not at all sure about that. Seriously. If you want we can have a > discussion on whether or not there are natural kinds. Fair enough. ... > > If you like there are various levels of convenience and to throw all > > words that name things into the same boat is to miss the significant [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > I think is false and troublesome. We are in the world and of the > world, not simply influenced by the world.) There was no intended implication at all that we are not in the world! Very much the reverse was my intention. We are creatures come through a process of evolution and we are greatly adapted to get by on earth. It is for this very reason that your enthusiastic agreement with "Wholes are ... grammatically convenient fictions" alarmed me. It sounded too much as if we deliberately picked and chose and could have fairly easily done quite differently. I think it a much more helpless process and builds on the way we naturally see the world as we adapted to it. But I am not quite sure we are clearly disagreeing about anything. Signaturedorayme >... >> >Words are fictions? You have lost me. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] >doc about it but we just argue... <g>) but there seems no obvious or >natural sense in which words are fictions? My point, and the presentation (but not me, of course) may have been awkward, is that the words are not the things. They are fictions because speech is not the thing. You can disagree with my use of fiction, I was trying to illustrate a point. And, face it, JJ is so muddled that it is hard to make a coherent reply. [snip] >There was no intended implication at all that we are not in the world! >Very much the reverse was my intention. We are creatures come through a >process of evolution and we are greatly adapted to get by on earth. It >is for this very reason that your enthusiastic agreement with "Wholes >are ... grammatically convenient fictions" alarmed me. Did I say that? OK, in that case I meant that it is always a little false to separate out one thing from the world. Think of the reference to a human body. But our bodies are a significant portion bacteria: do you we mean all of those organisms when we say the body? "Body" is a static term, but bodies are in constant interaction with the world. Of course we have to use such static terms, we are doing the best we can to communicate. I just wanted to remind us that the necessary simplification of language meant a serious loss of actual specificity. >It sounded too >much as if we deliberately picked and chose and could have fairly easily >done quite differently. I think it a much more helpless process and >builds on the way we naturally see the world as we adapted to it. > >But I am not quite sure we are clearly disagreeing about anything. Like most of these discussions, the issue is to find common language and referents. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback > <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > stuff nor that a thing *has* parts. Parts, wholes, relationships, > those are all things we name to communicate about the world. But if we acknowledge that communication then we can hardly call that communication a convenient fiction. >> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback >> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] >But if we acknowledge that communication then we can hardly call that >communication a convenient fiction. Why not? That it is useful does not make it true. That we know it is false does not make it true. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" >>> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback >>> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > Why not? That it is useful does not make it true. That we know it is > false does not make it true. If we thought that the objects in a task were a fiction, then we wouldn't commit to the task in the first place. >>>> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 21:31:42 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Shrikeback >>>> <shrikeback@gmail.com> in [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] >If we thought that the objects in a task were a fiction, then we >wouldn't commit to the task in the first place. The *stuff* is real, the words are real, but the words are not the things. That we call them parts is a useful fiction, but the stuff is still real. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" >>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > Exactly! A whole is not entirely a grammatically convenient fiction - because it destabilises the concept of an identifiable part or object. >>>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] >A whole is not entirely a grammatically convenient fiction - because it > destabilises the concept of an identifiable part or object. There are not wholes in the universe no more than there are parts in wholes. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically > > convenient fictions, and that they are, instead, descriptions of a > > whole. > > Wholes are also grammatically convenient fictions. Yes. JJ doesn't like it when you point out that he is rediscovering the universe every time he rediscovers the wheel. -tg > > FINALLY, AN EXAMPLE > > Before the example > > I love the juxtaposition here. > > Marshall >>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] >> >> Marshall see JJ above response >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > Marshall I meant that a part, or an object is always a description of a whole. A part or object, on its own terms, as "per se", is a grammatical fiction in that it does not reference either a part or an object, but that it references a whole. >>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > in that it does not reference either a part or an object, but that it > references a whole. It must be hell to live inside your head. >>>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > It must be hell to live inside your head. When I dream I wake up talking to myself. >> It must be hell to live inside your head. > > When I dream I wake up talking to myself. In the dream? >>> It must be hell to live inside your head. >> When I dream I wake up talking to myself. > > In the dream? Always busy, dream or no dream. > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically > convenient fictions, and that they are, instead, descriptions of a > whole. By "relationships" I refer to the relationships of objects, > behaviours, temporal sequence of events, etc. All you can say for certain is that something exists (because you, at least, are reading this). Following from that knowledge, define the universe as everything that exists. This is not a fact, just a definition. All you can do is theorize an unprovable and approximate model of the universe. You can never be sure that this model is correct. All you can do is make a lonely judgment as to how accurately your model predicts the future. It is up to you to adjust it as you see fit. It is impossible to tell the difference between an accurate model of reality with a convenient fiction. The current model that most people use breaks down the universe into parts, objects, and relationships. Not because there actually exists parts, objects and relationships - simply because this seems to provide a good frame of reference in which we can predict the future. To show this, try to express any useful prediction about the behavior of the universe without using parts, objects or relationships. You can't refer to food of any kind, because that would be conceding that objects exists. You can't even refer to your self, as that would concede that you are an object separate from the rest of the universe. All you can do is meditate catatonicly until you starve to death (at least, that is what my model predicts would happen). -Andrew. >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 27 lines] >death (at least, that is what my model predicts would happen). > -Andrew. Good post! With the constraints that seem to come with the extent whatever, 'we' are confounded. Folk talk and science talk are most all 'we' can do. In the meanwhile, IMO, because of these constraints, and the general situation, the place sucks. This leads me to consider that the situation and place is incidental and meaningless. Thus we need 'our' stories. Fight meaninglessness with at least fiction stories. Well practiced stories can become 'our' experienced reality. 'We' are insane anyway, let 'us' mold 'our' insanity such that 'we' can at least get by. >>> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >>> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 30 lines] > With the constraints that seem to come with the extent whatever, > 'we' are confounded. Folk talk and science talk are most all 'we' can do. Well, I evidently showed that it is NOT all we can do. It's as if you want to believe in a folk tale. >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > All you can say for certain is that something exists (because you, at > least, are reading this). This 'something' is ineffable because it cannot be described - it is not a part. > Following from that knowledge, define the > universe as everything that exists. This is not a fact, just a > definition. The definition falters on the definition of 'everything'. I argued that there are no parts to constitute an 'everything'. > All you can do is theorize an unprovable and approximate model of the > universe. I've already gone beyond that. There are no parts per se, I argued. > You can never be sure that this model is correct. But you can have surety if it is we that support or yield the frameworks of knowledge. See Kant. But again, I went beyond the model idea of parts. > All you > can do is make a lonely judgment as to how accurately your model > predicts the future. A judgement is always in the public domain, so it is never "lonely". > It is up to you to adjust it as you see fit. It > is impossible to tell the difference between an accurate model of [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > parts, objects and relationships - simply because this seems to > provide a good frame of reference in which we can predict the future. The future is itself a part. We can dispense with it. > To show this, try to express any useful prediction about the behavior > of the universe without using parts, objects or relationships. But we NEVER use parts or objects in our predictions. We simply employ different descriptions of the whole. > You > can't refer to food of any kind, because that would be conceding that > objects exists. But it doesn't infer that. Talk about food is always a description of a whole. > You can't even refer to your self, The referral makes no sense in any case. > AndrewTomazoswrote: > >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > This 'something' is ineffable because it cannot be described - it is not > a part. Lets use your language. "The whole" exists. What I call the universe you call the whole. We agree that the whole exists and this is in fact provable using the logic similar to 'I think therefore I am". > > Following from that knowledge, define the > > universe as everything that exists. This is not a fact, just a > > definition. > > The definition falters on the definition of 'everything'. I argued that > there are no parts to constitute an 'everything'. Ok, so define the universe as "the whole" then. > > All you can do is theorize an unprovable and approximate model of the > > universe. > > I've already gone beyond that. There are no parts per se, I argued. This is not provable. Let's suppose that I am skeptical of your claim that there are no parts. How can you prove that there are no parts? > > You can never be sure that this model is correct. > > But you can have surety if it is we that support or yield the frameworks > of knowledge. See Kant. But again, I went beyond the model idea of parts. No, you can't. If you cease to exists, do you believe that the universe would cease to exist? Maybe you do, maybe you don't, maybe you are not sure. In any case it cannot be logically proven one way or the other. I personally choose to believe in an absolute reality (as do most people) that exists outside of our "framework of knowledge" or our "model" of it. The "framework of knowledge" or "model" of this absolute reality can never be proven to be absolutely accurate in the face of doubt. > > All you > > can do is make a lonely judgment as to how accurately your model > > predicts the future. > > A judgement is always in the public domain, so it is never "lonely". You can never be sure that the public domain exists - perhaps it is all a figment of your imagination. Like a dream. Perhaps I dont exist and this is just you talking to yourself when you are reading this post. You can never be sure. Hence you have to choose alone how you predict the future events of the universe. That is what I mean by a "lonely judgement". Through looking at various different methods I have selected the scientific method and skepticism as the process by which I refine my model - as I recall that it has most accurately predicted past events. > > It is up to you to adjust it as you see fit. It > > is impossible to tell the difference between an accurate model of [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > > The future is itself a part. We can dispense with it. I recount the story of a philosopher that came to the conclusion to doubt the existence of everything. She chose to believe that "nothing is real". She wandered about starving and dehydrated until she walked off a cliff (that she didn't believe existed) and died. I assume you admit to eating food? Does this food just magically appear in front of you? Or do you make plans to acquire food and then eat it? If you do make plans in order to eat food, than you have conceded that the future exists. Why would you take actions in order to acquire food at a later time if you didn't believe in the future? > > To show this, try to express any useful prediction about the behavior > > of the universe without using parts, objects or relationships. > > But we NEVER use parts or objects in our predictions. We simply employ > different descriptions of the whole. Do you know what an apple is? Do you know what an orange is? Do you know what fruit is? If you answered yes to all three than you have conceded the ability to use abstraction. Continue up the tree of abstraction until you reach "object". > > You > > can't refer to food of any kind, because that would be conceding that > > objects exists. > > But it doesn't infer that. Talk about food is always a description of a > whole. You used the word "food", and by doing so have partitioned the whole into two parts. That part which is food, and that part which is not. You see my point? Parts are a useful concept, and form the basis of most facts we use day-to-day. In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out the difference between a "convenient fiction" and a "real absolute nonfiction" is a complete waste of time - as it is *impossible* to distinguish between them. -Andrew. >>> Following from that knowledge, define the >>> universe as everything that exists. This is not a fact, just a [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > Ok, so define the universe as "the whole" then. The universe is a bit problematic as it supposes something that must be described from an independent perspective. No, all I am saying is that whenever we take a sum or collation, we create a new object or whole. >>> All you can do is theorize an unprovable and approximate model of the >>> universe. >> I've already gone beyond that. There are no parts per se, I argued. > > This is not provable. Let's suppose that I am skeptical of your claim > that there are no parts. How can you prove that there are no parts? I'll start with Wittgenstein's saying, "to draw a line between a part which can, and a part which can't be represented is something I can't do in language." PI VIII sec85 In that case, "parts" fail to represent themselves. >>> You can never be sure that this model is correct. >> But you can have surety if it is we that support or yield the frameworks >> of knowledge. See Kant. But again, I went beyond the model idea of parts. > > No, you can't. If you cease to exists, do you believe that the > universe would cease to exist? There is something wrong with that question. If you don't mind I will start a new post on it. > Maybe you do, maybe you don't, maybe > you are not sure. In any case it cannot be logically proven one way [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > "model" of this absolute reality can never be proven to be absolutely > accurate in the face of doubt. Again, this draws on a mistake in the question. >>> All you >>> can do is make a lonely judgment as to how accurately your model [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > You can never be sure that the public domain exists - perhaps it is > all a figment of your imagination. Like a dream. Not if I create the objects in my world. I move with certainty in my world. > Perhaps I dont > exist and this is just you talking to yourself when you are reading [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > which I refine my model - as I recall that it has most accurately > predicted past events. The flaw in the question keeps recurring. >>> It is up to you to adjust it as you see fit. It >>> is impossible to tell the difference between an accurate model of [quoted text clipped - 25 lines] > conceded the ability to use abstraction. Continue up the tree of > abstraction until you reach "object". Yes, but in that case you might be arguing against your own position. If we create the objects, how can we be unsure about them? >>> You >>> can't refer to food of any kind, because that would be conceding that [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > distinguish between them. > -Andrew. There's another model, which you haven't considered, that can distinguish between them. Kantianism. >> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism >> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out >> the difference between a "convenient fiction" and a "real absolute >> nonfiction" is a complete waste of time - as it is *impossible* to >> distinguish between them. > There's another model, which you haven't considered, that can > distinguish between them. Kantianism. You're confused. It is impossible to distinguish between them and always will be. -Andrew. >>> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism >>> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > always will be. > -Andrew. Not if we are the authors of the worlds designs and objects. > >>> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism > >>> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out [quoted text clipped - 9 lines] > > Not if we are the authors of the worlds designs and objects. I don't know what that means. How would being the "author of the worlds designs and objects" help in distinguishing between "convenient fiction" and a "real absolute nonfiction" ? -Andrew. >>>>> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism >>>>> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > fiction" and a "real absolute nonfiction" ? > -Andrew. I mean that the templates for objecthood and the objects in the world are set up by us. So we can't have any existential doubt about them. > >>>>> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism > >>>>> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > I mean that the templates for objecthood and the objects in the world > are set up by us. So we can't have any existential doubt about them. If I hear something in the other room that either (a) might be the cat knocking something over; or (b) a burglar - and I suspect it's (b) - by your theory I shouldn't have any doubt that it really is a burglar. -Andrew. >>>>>>> In my opinion, you have not yet grasped the inescapably of pragmatism >>>>>>> when it comes to choosing what to believe is real. Trying to work out [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > by your theory I shouldn't have any doubt that it really is a burglar. > -Andrew. I don't have any doubt about the sorts of objects that exist. If I could see the burglar through a stone wall then he and the wall wouldn't be physical objects. It is part of the nature of physical objecthood that objects can be hidden. I don't have doubt over that. I am as sure of hideable objects as I am sure of revealed objects, as these are properties of the objecthood I create. I don't have particular knowledge of which objects are hidden, but I am in no doubt as to their nature. > There are no objects in the world. The world has no "parts". There are > no objects or parts because we only ever see a whole, and a whole is not > countable. I'd say while we live in this whole, thought, in order to exist, demands finite perceptions of this whole. Parts exist as parts. The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? >> There are no objects in the world. The world has no "parts". There are >> no objects or parts because we only ever see a whole, and a whole is not [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of > 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? No, I mean that the fiction is the idea that parts and objects exist in themselves. IT is a fiction because it is incomplete as a description. A full description is that parts and obejcts are always wholes. >> The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of >> 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? > > No, I mean that the fiction is the idea that parts and objects exist in > themselves. IT is a fiction because it is incomplete as a description. A > full description is that parts and obejcts are always wholes. OK I see. How are do you defining these in the common necessities of human utility? >>> The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of >>> 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > OK I see. How are do you defining these in the common necessities of > human utility? Utility is a renaming. > >>> The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of > >>> 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > > Utility is a renaming. Are you little buddha or something? You need to be more verbose in your statements. Try adding examples, and explaining the same thing in multiple ways. "Utility is a renaming" is most certainly trivially false by definition alone. We are not writing poetry here - we are trying to engage in logical argument. You seem to be saying that parts do not "exist in themselves" and are man-made. Propose a test we can conduct to see if your hypothesis is correct. -Andrew. >>>>> The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of >>>>> 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? [quoted text clipped - 15 lines] > correct. > -Andrew. I was in a rush. I am saying that utility doesn't "make use of objects". There are no independent objects. If we, as we usually do, describe objects in a number of scenarios, such as "useful" scenario's, then it is the new scenario (renaming) that defines our objects. There isn't an object that is common to all or any scenario's. > >>>>> The weight of your position seems to stands on your definition of > >>>>> 'fiction'. Do you mean a mistake? [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > is the new scenario (renaming) that defines our objects. There isn't an > object that is common to all or any scenario's. Ok, so how can we test if your statement is correct? How can we discover whether there are indeed no independent objects? -Andrew. . >>> You seem to be saying that parts do not "exist in themselves" and are >>> man-made. Propose a test we can conduct to see if your hypothesis is [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > discover whether there are indeed no independent objects? > -Andrew. I would employ a grammatical or philosophical investigation. I would start by asking how or in what way I can know that objects exist. > . > >>> You seem to be saying that parts do not "exist in themselves" and are [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > I would employ a grammatical or philosophical investigation. I would > start by asking how or in what way I can know that objects exist. At this point you need to define what you mean what you use the word "know". Simply saying it is the common usage, or the same as my definition, is not precise enough in this context. If you say "I know X", what does that actually mean? -Andrew. >> . >>>>> You seem to be saying that parts do not "exist in themselves" and are [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > X", what does that actually mean? > -Andrew. I would investigate how I am able to know things about objects. If it is through my senses then I am led into doubt as to what the object really is. but if I set the conditions or physical limits for the manifestation of the object, then I am in no doubt about its existence. > >> . > >>>>> You seem to be saying that parts do not "exist in themselves" and are [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > is. but if I set the conditions or physical limits for the manifestation > of the object, then I am in no doubt about its existence. That doesn't answer my question at all. I asked what you mean when you say "I know X". In this case "to know things about objects". What do you mean when you said the word "know"? -Andrew. >>>> I would employ a grammatical or philosophical investigation. I would >>>> start by asking how or in what way I can know that objects exist. [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > What do you mean when you said the word "know"? > -Andrew. I can ask what are the conditions for knowing that objects, or their properties exist; that is, I ask what, if anything, makes their existence necessary. > FINALLY, AN EXAMPLE > Before the example, I give, as further description of my point, wholes [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > grammatical descriptions of a whole. Now, every time we create an > object, or refer to an an object, we create a whole. So wholes are emergent and have no parts, but emergent means "coming into being from more basic constituents or parts" Spot the contradiction in that sentence! The term emergent is also just a grammatical description after all, but you are quite happy to use it as a crutch to support your own grammatical description that parts and objects are merely grammatical descriptions. So the whole (pun intended) dissapears up it's own hole and out pops Jones, saying "only I and the (w)hole exist" Solipsism at it's finest >> FINALLY, AN EXAMPLE >> Before the example, I give, as further description of my point, wholes [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > So wholes are emergent and have no parts, but emergent means "coming > into being from more basic constituents or parts" Something like that, yes. It seems from our observations that wholes come into being from other wholes, like a bouquet from flowers. Or, we could say that the bouquet is the manifesting condition for the flowers. > Spot the contradiction in that sentence! I know it looks like there is a contradiction, but I don't think there is one. I'm not making any temporal/causal process the reason for the emergence of new wholes. > The term emergent is also just a grammatical description after all, > but you are quite happy to use it as a crutch to support your own > grammatical description that parts and objects are merely grammatical > descriptions. Not that there's anything wrong with description, but I'm saying that for parts and objects, that's all we have. The true ontology rests with the whole. The whole is the manifesting condition for objects that are its parts. These parts have no independent existence. > A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 49 lines] > umbrella in relationship, there is a whole state of affairs "umbrella in > the hallway" that bears no relationship to its supposed "parts". No body will agree with you. Objects made a whole, just like individual make the people. >> A RIDICULOUS IDEA? >> I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically [quoted text clipped - 52 lines] > No body will agree with you. > Objects made a whole, just like individual make the people. Yes. I am saying also that individuals are a whole. I am also saying that wholes are incommensurable. >A RIDICULOUS IDEA? > I argue that relationships, parts and objects are grammatically convenient [quoted text clipped - 49 lines] > umbrella in relationship, there is a whole state of affairs "umbrella in > the hallway" that bears no relationship to its supposed "parts". It seems to me there must at least be two parts to the world. The experiencer and the experienced. Otherwise you are left with solipsism. It also seems reasonable to assume that other people, who appear to be very similar to me, are, so they are also experiencers, seperate from me and seperate from what we jointly experience. It is only another small step that animals are similar in this respect, plants and even descrete objects. In article <XMudnVIM27R--8zXnZ2dnUVZ8oSdnZ2d@giganews.com>, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> wrote: > It seems to me there must at least be two parts to the world. The > experiencer and the experienced. Otherwise you are left with solipsism. If there were no experiencers, that would not be solipsism, rather it would be further along the road to mindlessness... <g> Signaturedorayme > In article <XMudnVIM27R--8zXnZ2dnUVZ8oSdnZ2d@giganews.com>, > "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > If there were no experiencers, that would not be solipsism, rather it > would be further along the road to mindlessness... <g> But I am an experiencer. In article <CdGdncmvRZ_XEczXnZ2dnUVZ8vudnZ2d@giganews.com>, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> wrote: > > In article <XMudnVIM27R--8zXnZ2dnUVZ8oSdnZ2d@giganews.com>, > > "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > > But I am an experiencer. But you are not a logically necessary being. Signaturedorayme > In article <CdGdncmvRZ_XEczXnZ2dnUVZ8vudnZ2d@giganews.com>, > "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > But you are not a logically necessary being. As long as I exist then surely I am a logically necessary being. Of course the fact I exist in contingent, but once I exist, I really do exist, at least from my own pov. In article <LpCdnYqwV6xjVczXnZ2dnUVZ8tadnZ2d@giganews.com>, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> wrote: > > In article <CdGdncmvRZ_XEczXnZ2dnUVZ8vudnZ2d@giganews.com>, > > "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > > As long as I exist then surely I am a logically necessary being. Nope. 'Giga is necessary being' is a shorthand way of saying that "'Giga exists' is a necessarily true statement". Since we agree that 'Giga exists' is a continently true statement (see your below), it follows that you are not a necessary being. > Of course > the fact I exist in contingent, but once I exist, I really do exist, at > least from my own pov. Who would disagree with this last? Signaturedorayme > Nope. 'Giga is necessary being' is a shorthand way of saying that "'Giga > exists' is a necessarily true statement". Since we agree that 'Giga > exists' is a continently true statement (see your below), it follows > that you are not a necessary being. oops, I must be tired. Too much work today! Been making a few typos lately! Not "continently" but "contingently" Signaturedorayme >> Nope. 'Giga is necessary being' is a shorthand way of saying that "'Giga >> exists' is a necessarily true statement". Since we agree that 'Giga [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > oops, I must be tired. Too much work today! Been making a few typos > lately! Not "continently" but "contingently" Its true that I am contingent in the sense that I may not have existed (I'm sure) but surely the fact that I do indeed exist is not contigent, and therefore must be necessary? In other words it is no longer possible for my existence to be contingent, because I do and always will have, however shorty, existed. In article <gJmdnS8mYaUWf8zXnZ2dnUVZ8qmdnZ2d@giganews.com>, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> wrote: > >> Nope. 'Giga is necessary being' is a shorthand way of saying that "'Giga > >> exists' is a necessarily true statement". Since we agree that 'Giga [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Its true that I am contingent in the sense that I may not have existed (I'm > sure) but surely the fact that I do indeed exist is not contigent, 'Giga is contingent' is a shorthand way of saying "'Giga exists' is contingently true". The fact that you exist is just 'Giga exists' being true. And we can see how this is a contingent truth. So no again, you are not a necessary being. > and > therefore must be necessary? In other words it is no longer possible for my > existence to be contingent, because I do and always will have, however > shorty, existed. Naturally, 'If Giga exists, then Giga exists' is a necessarily true statement. It still does not mean you necessarily exist. Signaturedorayme >> >> Nope. 'Giga is necessary being' is a shorthand way of saying that >> >> "'Giga exists' is a necessarily true statement". Since we agree that [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] > Naturally, 'If Giga exists, then Giga exists' is a necessarily true > statement. It still does not mean you necessarily exist. Yes. P: possible N: necessary ->: material implication Px -> NPx ...is a basic finding of modal logic, that is, if a thing is possible, then it is necessarily possible. (This is not to say the thing is necessary.) > In article <gJmdnS8mYaUWf8zXnZ2dnUVZ8qmdnZ2d@giganews.com>, > "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)holme@yahoo.co> [quoted text clipped - 23 lines] > Naturally, 'If Giga exists, then Giga exists' is a necessarily true > statement. It still does not mean you necessarily exist. I think we agree, kind of? >> But you are not a logically necessary being. > > As long as I exist then surely I am a logically necessary being. Of > course the fact I exist in contingent, but once I exist, I really do > exist, at least from my own pov. The logic of necessity has actually been worked out. If you exist in one state-description (metaphorically the term "possible world" is more common) then your are _possible_. If you exist in every state-description, then you are _necessary_. Since you don't know if you exist in every possible world, you are just contingent. For more detailed information, google "modal logic." >>> But you are not a logically necessary being. >> [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > > For more detailed information, google "modal logic." I studied modal logic a bit and possible worlds. It all depends if you beleive in other worlds, an infinity of them. I'm not sure I do, and if they must by necessity be forever closed to us then I'm not sure they are even relevant. >>>> But you are not a logically necessary being. >>> [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > they must by necessity be forever closed to us then I'm not sure they > are even relevant. I agree with that, which is why I prefer "state-descriptions." Any talk about "necessity" in the physical world is suspect. Still, modal logic is consistent an weakly complete, so if you're going to talk about necessity, you might as well do it using logic. >>>>> But you are not a logically necessary being. >>>> [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > going to talk about necessity, you might as well do it using > logic. It is useful for that, which is probably why it is used in teaching. But possibility and necessity seems to me apply to something that may or may not exist, and something that must exist (probably a bit of an outdated concept as well). Once something does exist it is no longer possible for it not to exist (or have existed) and is in a way necessary at that point. On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > Once something does exist it is no longer possible for it not to > exist (or have existed) and is in a way necessary at that point. This is incorrect. A counterfactual is a statement about how things could have been in spite of how they actually are. So, that something is true in fact does not make it necessarily true at all. > On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) > ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > >> Once something does exist it is no longer possible for it not to >> exist (or have existed) and is in a way necessary at that point. If a thing is possible, it is necessary that it is _possible_. Px -> NPx > This is incorrect. A counterfactual is a statement about how things > could have been in spite of how they actually are. So, that something is > true in fact does not make it necessarily true at all. True. A thing that is necessarily possible is not necessarily necessary. ~(NPx -> Nx) >> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > ~(NPx -> Nx) But what about actual? >>> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >>> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 16 lines] >> > But what about actual? A thing that is possible is true at at least one state-description. Translation would depend on how "actual" relates to "true." For many of us they are vaguely synonymous, but you'll have to take that up with the Shadow. Given synonymy, you would get: A thing that is possible is actual at at least one state-description. >>>> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >>>> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 25 lines] > > A thing that is possible is actual at at least one state-description. Then if we take the multiverse (all possible worlds) then if I exist in one world I must exist in the multiverse taken as a whole. Doesn't this mean that essentially everything possible is in fact necessary? Must exist somewhere and therefore must exist. Anyway I'm not sure how I got onto this rather obtuse subject from 'Does the world have parts?'. >>>>> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >>>>> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 29 lines] > mean that essentially everything possible is in fact necessary? Must > exist somewhere and therefore must exist. No. They are interpreted as _possible_ worlds. A truth in one of them makes it possible. Your intuition, if I am interpreting it correctly, is covered by the fact that if a thing is possible, it is _necessarily_ possible. Px -> NPx > Anyway I'm not sure how I got onto this rather obtuse subject from 'Does > the world have parts?'. >>>>>> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >>>>>> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 32 lines] > it correctly, is covered by the fact that if a thing is possible, > it is _necessarily_ possible. Technically, that is true because the definition of multiverse implied is "all possible worlds", and that is different from an infinity of "worlds". Possible is not defined. Its impossible interpretation nullifies the whole posit. >>>>>>> On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe >>>>>>> end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 37 lines] > is "all possible worlds", and that is different from an infinity of > "worlds". "Multiverse" is not used in any version of modal logic that I have studied. An infinity of worlds/state-descriptions may or may not be the case. It just depends on the universe of discourse. Of course, modal logic works just the same if you interpret it as ranging over state-descriptions, which I prefer to use but which is less common among logicians. > Possible is not defined. Most, logicians take talk of possible worlds to be metaphorical. Conceivable or envisageable state of affairs is more to the point but less convenient. > Its impossible interpretation > nullifies the whole posit. What was wanted is a system that is compatible with predicate calculus that would handle modal terms like necessity and possibility. Modal logic does this while maintaining rigorous consistency and completeness. So, if you are going to talk about modal terms at all, you might as well do so within a system that prevents many of the errors of natural language. > > On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) > > ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > ~(NPx -> Nx) Polymer! You have turned from a human being into a Modal Logic Parrot! <g> <http://people.aapt.net.au/~miltonreid/flicks/parrot.mov> Signaturedorayme >> > On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >> > ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > Polymer! You have turned from a human being into a Modal Logic Parrot! > <g> http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=dancing+parrot&hl=en&emb=0&aq=f# Who woundn't want to be! On Jul 7, 7:26 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > Once something does exist it is no longer possible for it not to > exist (or have existed) and is in a way necessary at that point. This is incorrect. A counterfactual is a statement about how things could have been in spite of how they actually are. So, that something is true in fact does not make it necessarily true at all. = I'm sure you are right but it still seems to me that once something in actual fact does exist then it is impossible for it never to have existed (as a good a definition of necessity as I can generate). [snip] >It seems to me there must at least be two parts to the world. The >experiencer and the experienced. To call them parts implies that they are more distinct than they are in reality. [snip] SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" > [snip] > [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > [snip] Perhaps, but that is not known. Solipcism could be true, in which case monism is plausible. Idelaism could be true and everything is the mind of God, perhaps including the little bubble I call my consciousness. Some kind of dualism could be true, and then there are two seperate elements, at least. But even if mateialism is true surely there is consciousness and what it is aware of, at least. >> [snip] >> [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] >Perhaps, but that is not known. Solipcism could be true, in which case >monism is plausible. Sorry, but I find solipsism too stupid to discuss. Nor will any real solipsist bother to engage in conversation. >Idelaism could be true and everything is the mind of >God, perhaps including the little bubble I call my consciousness. Sure, could be. And if you play that game, then there is still no reason to discuss anything. >Some kind >of dualism could be true, and then there are two seperate elements, at >least. But even if mateialism is true surely there is consciousness and what >it is aware of, at least. > SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" >>> [snip] >>> [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > Sorry, but I find solipsism too stupid to discuss. Nor will any real > solipsist bother to engage in conversation. Yeah. I doubt anybody really beleives this. It would be awefully lonely. >>Idelaism could be true and everything is the mind of >>God, perhaps including the little bubble I call my consciousness. > > Sure, could be. And if you play that game, then there is still no > reason to discuss anything. Not so sure I agree with you there, as that little bubble of consciousness could have some genuine independence. >>Some kind >>of dualism could be true, and then there are two seperate elements, at >>least. But even if mateialism is true surely there is consciousness and >>what >>it is aware of, at least. On Jul 12, 1:58 am, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > > On Mon, 6 Jul 2009 03:52:10 +0100, in alt.atheism , "Giga" <"Giga" > > <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)ho...@yahoo.co> in [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > > Perhaps, but that is not known. Solipcism could be true,.... "could" ! Mere logical possibilities have no real reasoning power to sow seeds of doubt. On Jul 12, 1:58 am, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > "Matt Silberstein" <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in > messagenews:tqah551l7qbk3emfuk3lpmlh2u96ncu3o6@4ax.com... [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > Perhaps, but that is not known. Solipcism could be true,.... "could" ! Mere logical possibilities have no real reasoning power to sow seeds of doubt. = I don't think its a mere logical possibility, and I don't beleive it has been disproved. I feel it is not true, hope it is not true, beleive it is not true, have faith it is not true, but it has not been proved rationally one way or the other, and may not be able to be. On Jul 12, 5:30 pm, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: > "Patricia Aldoraz" <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> wrote in message > [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > = I don't think its a mere logical possibility, and I don't beleive it has > been disproved. ... Perhaps you are simply confusing that we know there are other people with the question how we know. It does not follow that we do not know something because we do not know how we know it. It is an elementary philosophical error that many people fall into the trap of. On Jul 12, 2:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Perhaps you are simply confusing that we know there are other people > with the question how we know. It does not follow that we do not know > something because we do not know how we know it. How can you know something if you can't explain how you know it? This is faith or intuition isn't it? It is my understanding that within a logical argument, we must always appeal to reason. > It is an elementary philosophical error that many people fall into the trap of. That is a somewhat bold statement. Can you site any references to support your claim? -Andrew >On Jul 12, 2:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> >wrote: [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] >That is a somewhat bold statement. Can you site any references to >support your claim? I won't say she can't, but she hasn't yet. > -Andrew > On Jul 12, 2:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> > wrote: [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > How can you know something if you can't explain how you know it? Easy, see below. > This > is faith or intuition isn't it? No. Experts in many fields cannot always explain how or why they know things but they do. >It is my understanding that within a > logical argument, we must always appeal to reason. This is vague or a confusing. We appeal to facts often. We appeal to sub arguments. We make many appeals and the idea that it is all reasonable is not the same as the idea that there is something called reason which we appeal to. > > It is an elementary philosophical error that many people fall into the trap of. > > That is a somewhat bold statement. Can you site any references to > support your claim? > -Andrew 1. I do not cite references for anything on usenet (unless there is a bet involved and money is guaranteed). 2. I believe people on usenet in philosophy already suffer the ridiculous disease (just look around here Andrew!) of arguing by authority. and 3. I will do better for you by explaining it right here and now briefly. Are you ready? It is not a miracle that we are adapted to life on earth. If we did not know things, we would hardly likely be alive and mainly doing not too bad at all. Notice how we got to the moon? It was not luck, Andrew! And when we add up all the things that we had to know to get there and call it knowing p, your demand that we should know how we know p is a demand for which there is no obvious argument. Kids know their way to school. At least they used to when they walked there! <g>. But ever asked some kids a half intelligent question? Forget about how do you know that turning left at such and such a street and ... is the way to school? They may simply not be able to even understand the question or they may be rather inarticulate and shrug. The point is that it is not a *logical connection* between their knowing the way and their knowing how they know. And this is a rather wide and general thing about knowledge. The expert chicken sexer can look at a chick and know straight away what sex it is. He has a trained eye. If you ask him how he knows in an individual case, he will be unable to tell you. Want more actual cases? There are millions more. In every possible field, from knowing how to do things to knowing that things are the case. Or would you be interested in a general argument? How about: If knowledge is possible, then there must be some knowledge without knowledge about it. I will say this another way: If it were a requirement of knowing p that you had to know that you knew p, then this would have the daunting consequence of an infinite regress of a not very nice kind. It would make knowledge impossible. On Jul 13, 5:05 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> wrote: > It is not a miracle that we are adapted to life on earth. If we did > not know things, we would hardly likely be alive and mainly doing not [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > this would have the daunting consequence of an infinite regress of a > not very nice kind. It would make knowledge impossible. There are those that claim that we did not adapt to life on Earth, and that we were put here by design by some creator - and that it is a miracle. Such a person would claim they they *know* that there is a God. There are those that genuinely believe that the moon landing was a staged hoax perpetrated by the government. Some would even claim to *know* so. I'm sure even an expert at determining the sex of a chicken from a visual inspection is fallible in some cases. They might claim they *know* the sex from looking at it, even if in a small fraction of the cases this is clearly not the case. Did you know for example that some animals are born (humans included) without a clear X chromosome or Y chromosome, but as some kind of mixed-gender hybrid. Can you conceive of a case where such a chicken would be misclassified by the expert as exactly male or exactly female? In this case the expert would claim to *know* something that isn't true. I think in common usage when someone says that they know something, they mean they are extremely sure and have no reasonable doubt. This is different from really knowing something is absolutely true. Usually this distinction is unimportant, however when discussing the foundations of logic and philosophy it is an important subject. If you had to bet something of great value on one of the following: A. We really landed on the moon B. 2 + 2 = 4 which would you choose? Even though we "know" both are true, most people would choose B. Even though there is a great deal of evidence that A is true, there is something that goes beyond evidence to support the truth of B, namely mechanical logical deduction from axioms and definitions. The point of studying Solipsism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Postivism and so forth - is to understand that we can only apply logical deduction to our perceived world if we have some system or method by which to decide what we assume is true. Logical deduction alone gets us as far as "I think therefore I am". Beyond that we cannot, in the strongest absolute logical sense, *know* anything. The modern scientific community works around this limitation by agreeing that what we say we know is actually just a model that makes testable predictions about future events. We change the model when it mispredicts or makes no prediction in an area of interest. Stating that we "know" something just means that the model predicts it, not that we really literally know it is true. -Andrew. > On Jul 13, 5:05 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> > wrote: [quoted text clipped - 45 lines] > > which would you choose? Why choose something over which there is a little doubt? Why not choose for A. that most people know where their toilets are in their houses? ... > The point of studying Solipsism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Postivism and > so forth - is to understand that we can only apply logical deduction > to our perceived world if we have some system or method by which to > decide what we assume is true. I doubt it and see no argument for such a proposition > Logical deduction alone gets us as far > as "I think therefore I am". Beyond that we cannot, in the strongest > absolute logical sense, *know* anything. You have an unrealistic and unworkable idea of logical thought. Your mistake is to confuse logical validity with reasonable argument. The two are in no ways identical. > The modern scientific community works around this limitation by > agreeing that what we say we know is actually just a model that makes [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > that we really literally know it is true. > -Andrew. The scientists in the scientific community do not work around any limitations when they get out of bed and go to the bathroom. They know where it is and what it is for. You seem to be thinking that to know p something you must believe p and it is 100% probable where probability is measured in logical possibility scales. This is a completely fruitless scale in which to think. On Jul 13, 10:11 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I think in common usage when someone says that they know something, > > they mean they are extremely sure and have no reasonable doubt. This [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > choose for A. that most people know where their toilets are in their > houses? I am not sure what you are saying. You are asserting that the statement "most people know where their toilets are in their houses" is absolutely 100% true, and equally as true as the fact that "2+2=4" ? > > The point of studying Solipsism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Postivism and > > so forth - is to understand that we can only apply logical deduction > > to our perceived world if we have some system or method by which to > > decide what we assume is true. > > I doubt it and see no argument for such a proposition You seem to understand the argument for that proposition very well, considering how good you are making my point for me. > > Logical deduction alone gets us as far > > as "I think therefore I am". Beyond that we cannot, in the strongest [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > mistake is to confuse logical validity with reasonable argument. The > two are in no ways identical. Isn't that exactly the point I am making? Something that is reasonable to believe (by some method) is not identical to something being undeniably logically true. The Solipsist world view may be unreasonable using the Positivist method, but you cannot disprove it logically or in general. > The scientists in the scientific community do not work around any > limitations when they get out of bed and go to the bathroom. They know > where it is and what it is for. Let's suppose that one of the scientists is deaf, and in the middle of the night a tornado hits his house and sends the part of his house with the toilet flying off kilometers away. He may wake up in the morning thinking he knows where his toilet is. He would of course be wrong. > You seem to be thinking that to know > p something you must believe p and it is 100% probable where > probability is measured in logical possibility scales. This is a > completely fruitless scale in which to think. You are arguing my case for me. I completely agree that the Solipsist viewpoint is fruitless and even dangerous. That alone does not disprove it - nor make it logically false. Just because something is not useful does not make it false. You have to define some other set of rules about what is "worth" believing - and that is exactly what scientists do. -Andrew. > On Jul 13, 10:11 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > I think in common usage when someone says that they know something, > > > they mean they are extremely sure and have no reasonable doubt. This > > > is different from really knowing something is absolutely true. You better tell me then, what it means to say "X knows something is absolutely true". > > > Usually this distinction is unimportant, however when discussing the > > > foundations of logic and philosophy it is an important subject. It is? It is just an important subject? Is it not important in some particular respect? And what respect would that be? > > > If you had to bet something of great value on one of the following: > [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > I am not sure what you are saying. And I am not sure what the difference is between your A and your B, apart from that one is logically necessary and the other is not. I thought I would take a wild guess and suppose that the B you chose is not something all of us can be utterly sure of. So I substituted one where there is no doubt at all. Is there something wrong in me doing this? > You are asserting that the > statement "most people know where their toilets are in their houses" > is absolutely 100% true, and equally as true as the fact that > "2+2=4" ? I am asserting no such thing. I am saying that we can be equally sure of both. All this undefined "absolutely 100% true" is your terminology, not mine. > > > The point of studying Solipsism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Postivism and > > > so forth - is to understand that we can only apply logical deduction [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > You seem to understand the argument for that proposition very well, > considering how good you are making my point for me. If you say so, but I am none the wiser for you saying this. > > > Logical deduction alone gets us as far > > > as "I think therefore I am". Beyond that we cannot, in the strongest [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > Isn't that exactly the point I am making? Not sure what point you are making. If you are saying that an argument that proceeds from premises which we cannot be 100% certain of is a big worry, you will be very disappointed with science and philosophy and life on earth. Something that is > reasonable to believe (by some method) is not identical to something > being undeniably logically true. The Solipsist world view may be > unreasonable using the Positivist method, but you cannot disprove it > logically or in general. There are no methods that I know of for reasoning. > > The scientists in the scientific community do not work around any > > limitations when they get out of bed and go to the bathroom. They know [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > morning thinking he knows where his toilet is. He would of course be > wrong. Yes, he would be wrong in spite of being 100% certain. Your point is? That we should consciously be more humble in our certainties. That we should grab a potty on the way to the usual toilet in case we find it has moved a 100K away and could never make it? > > You seem to be thinking that to know > > p something you must believe p and it is 100% probable where [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > You are arguing my case for me. I completely agree that the Solipsist > viewpoint is fruitless and even dangerous. I never agreed to this. I never said it was dangerous. Nor that thinking about is fruitless. > That alone does not > disprove it - nor make it logically false. If you mean by logically false, its negation is logically necessary, yes but so what? >Just because something is > not useful does not make it false. You have to define some other set > of rules about what is "worth" believing - and that is exactly what > scientists do. They do no such thing in fact in the main. They just get on with proposing and testing theories and investigating things... On Jul 13, 3:20 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> wrote: > You better tell me then, what it means to say "X knows something is > absolutely true". It means that it is impossible to be false. It is impossible that I don't exist. If you are reading this than it is impossible you don't exist. It is impossible under the rules of ZFC and classical logic that 2+2 is not equal to 4. > > > > Usually this distinction is unimportant, however when discussing the > > > > foundations of logic and philosophy it is an important subject. > > It is? It is just an important subject? Is it not important in some > particular respect? And what respect would that be? Well one area it is important in is understanding why asking if the "world really has parts or do we just think it does" is not a useful question. You have read the entire thread of course, and didn't just jump in out-of-context. > > > > If you had to bet something of great value on one of the following: > [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] > of both. All this undefined "absolutely 100% true" is your > terminology, not mine. Well you are simply wrong. We cannot be 100% sure this isn't all a dream. We can't be 100% sure that most people (any other people) even exist, much less know where their toilets are. This is vastly different from the statement "2+2=4" or "I exist", of which we can be 100% sure of. > Not sure what point you are making. If you are saying that an argument > that proceeds from premises which we cannot be 100% certain of is a > big worry, you will be very disappointed with science and philosophy > and life on earth. Where exactly did I use any words even vaguely like "big worry"? > > reasonable to believe (by some method) is not identical to something > > being undeniably logically true. The Solipsist world view may be > > unreasonable using the Positivist method, but you cannot disprove it > > logically or in general. > > There are no methods that I know of for reasoning. Well, do some reading... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasoning or virtually any introductory philosophy book would do. > > > The scientists in the scientific community do not work around any > > > limitations when they get out of bed and go to the bathroom. They know [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > should grab a potty on the way to the usual toilet in case we find it > has moved a 100K away and could never make it? You're jumping to conclusions I didn't draw. Just because we can't be sure our model of the world is not 100% correct doesn't mean we should throw it out. > > That alone does not > > disprove it - nor make it logically false. > > If you mean by logically false, its negation is logically necessary, > yes but so what? You said before that "we know there are other people". My point is you are wrong if you take the definition of the word "know" in the strictness sense, which you clearly must do when discussing Solipsism. > >Just because something is > > not useful does not make it false. You have to define some other set [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > They do no such thing in fact in the main. They just get on with > proposing and testing theories and investigating things... You are wrong. Scientists have a very well-defined set of rules for choosing what to believe. Look up the "Scientific Method" and "Scientific Communication". Pay special attention to the history of those two items. -Andrew. > On Jul 13, 3:20 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com> > wrote: [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > > It means that it is impossible to be false. Not so. Something can be necessarily true without X knowing it. .... > > > You are asserting that the > > > statement "most people know where their toilets are in their houses" [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > different from the statement "2+2=4" or "I exist", of which we can be > 100% sure of. If I am wrong, I am certainly not *simply* wrong. There is no *vast difference* in respect to the estimate I can reasonably place on "there are other people" and "2+2=4". Your sole criterion of this difference is that the first is not a necessarily true statement while the latter is. And you interpret this difference as one that simply translates into degrees of certainty. But I am complaining that you have not made this case out. > > Not sure what point you are making. If you are saying that an argument > > that proceeds from premises which we cannot be 100% certain of is a > > big worry, you will be very disappointed with science and philosophy > > and life on earth. > > Where exactly did I use any words even vaguely like "big worry"? You did not use these words. It is not relevant that you did not. I meant you are making out that there is some real uncertainty of concern. Or are you not being serious? > > > reasonable to believe (by some method) is not identical to something > > > being undeniably logically true. The Solipsist world view may be [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > Well, do some reading... Thank you, I have. Have you read enough and with comprehension or are you jumping to a few conclusions based too much undigested reading? > > > Let's suppose that one of the scientists is deaf, and in the middle of > > > the night a tornado hits his house and sends the part of his house [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > sure our model of the world is not 100% correct doesn't mean we should > throw it out. Actually, yes, I am and maybe to correct conclusions and maybe you are jumping to incorrect ones. If there is some proposition we are 100% reluctant to throw out, it does not matter if it is not a necessary truth, this shows our certainty. You are trying to put a gap into the degree of strength with which we hold on to propositions based purely on the status of logical necessity or contingency and you are not making any progress. ... > You said before that "we know there are other people". My point is > you are wrong if you take the definition of the word "know" in the > strictness sense, which you clearly must do when discussing Solipsism. This business of the"strictest" sense of "know" are what we are discussing. Your definition is simply self serving. Of course, if it includes the idea that something cannot be known for sure if it is not logically necessary then perhaps you should wonder about the usefulness of your definition. > > >Just because something is > > > not useful does not make it false. You have to define some other set [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > "Scientific Communication". Pay special attention to the history of > those two items. I have and have not discovered these well defined rules of reasoning. And neither have you. You are elevating bunches of criteria for judging what is a scientific bit of reasoning from a non-scientific bit of reasoning to a status it simply does not deserve. >On Jul 12, 1:58 am, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) >ho...@yahoo.co> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 26 lines] >not true, have faith it is not true, but it has not been proved rationally >one way or the other, and may not be able to be. It is meaningless and, so, dull. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" On Jul 12, 2:22 pm, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >= I don't think its a mere logical possibility, and I don't beleive it has > >been disproved. I feel it is not true, hope it is not true, beleive it is > >not true, have faith it is not true, but it has not been proved rationally > >one way or the other, and may not be able to be. > > It is meaningless and, so, dull. If it is so meaningless and dull than why is it taught in nearly every freshman philosophy class? Why do we still discuss it 2500 years after the concept was first given a name? -Andrew. On Sun, 12 Jul 2009 08:24:00 -0700 (PDT), in alt.atheism , Andrew Tomazos <andrew@tomazos.com> in <308309d9-1628-4d51-af91-f7194ac849d3@s6g2000vbp.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On Jul 12, 2:22 pm, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] >freshman philosophy class? Why do we still discuss it 2500 years >after the concept was first given a name? OK, so what other than the two sentence presentation and the name do you have? It is not discussed, it is mentioned, and then they move on. SignatureMatt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" |
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