| Thread | Last Post | Replies |
|
| Logic for babies | 30 Nov 2008 17:12 GMT | 1 |
Here: http://www.amazon.com/Classical-Propositional-Operators-Exercise-Foundations/dp/ 0198531737/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1228044951&sr=1-1 we read that the reading level of Krister Segerberg's Classical Propositional Operators: An Exercise in the Foundations of Logic is
|
| The Constitution of the Kingdom of God, Earth, effective always (www.grishenkoff.com) | 30 Nov 2008 16:03 GMT | 4 |
The Constitution of the Kingdom of God, Earth, effective always (www.grishenkoff.com)
|
| fixed points with ordinal maps | 29 Nov 2008 08:55 GMT | 2 |
If we have p(alpha) = omega + alpha, for ordinals alpha, then the fixed points of p are: omega^2, omega^2 +1, ... and the fixed points of
|
| #4 Introduction-- In the beginning... ; new book 2nd edition: Math a subset of Physics, AP-adics | 29 Nov 2008 07:10 GMT | 1 |
INTRODUCTION Alright, let us get going. Mathematics is a subset of Physics, because Physics explains math and why there is math.
|
| #4 preface- Elliptic geometry Unioned Hyperbolic yields Euclidean ; new book 2nd edition: Math a subset of Physics, AP-adics | 28 Nov 2008 21:05 GMT | 1 |
Alright, I am going to stop with the preliminaries of this preface and dive into the book itself. I could probably spend the next months on the preliminaries and to fix and consolidate
|
| The Nature of Physical Reality - Analyzing the Properties of Space-time | 26 Nov 2008 18:43 GMT | 208 |
I will resume discussions in Special Relativity from where I left off. Here we analyze the properties of space-time as proposed by Einstein. I start of with a definition of terminologies. This will assure unambiguity in discussing the fundamental basis of reality
|
| Models and consistency | 25 Nov 2008 21:04 GMT | 32 |
I have some conflicts about terminlogies related to First order Logic. The way I understand things, it seems that consistency is same as having a model. So, if L is a model of ZF then ZF is consistent isn't it?.
|
| definable set, per Takeuti & Zaring | 25 Nov 2008 18:58 GMT | 5 |
On page 13 of Takeuti & Zaring's 'Introduction To Axiomatic Set Theory' we read [here, I'm using 'P' for the greek letter phi]: "Those sets {x | P(x)}, for which P(x) has no free variables other than x we call definable sets.
|
| The approximate and the non-discrete distinction | 25 Nov 2008 15:41 GMT | 4 |
I will use pi to draw a useful distinction between the approximate and the non-discrete. DISCUSSION Pi is not discreet and so cannot have an "approximate value" or a "fixed
|
| Givens. | 24 Nov 2008 22:45 GMT | 15 |
Is it possible for there to be 'givens'? Surely propositional logic is useful when we can conceive of a given proposition being true or false. What if there were such things as phrases in general, which range from having 1 possible value to a
|
| the axioms of set theory are inconsistent as shown by the skolem paradox | 24 Nov 2008 18:44 GMT | 32 |
the australian philosopher colin leslie dean points out the axioms of se theory are inconsistent as shown by the skolem paradox G. Frege say "PLEEEEZZE present a
|
| Reqest for Review/Tutelage of a Proof | 24 Nov 2008 18:29 GMT | 57 |
Let N be the set of natural numbers (ordinals) which is guaranteed to exist by the axiom of infinity. Let P(N) be the powerset of N, which is guaranteed to exist by the axiom of power set. Let Q denote the empty set.
|
| An example of solving an equation | 24 Nov 2008 17:01 GMT | 2 |
In mathematics we are used to solve equations. In logic (http://koti. 24.fi/prolog/) we can also write equations and solve them. An example. Socrates (s) is a human being (h) and x. It follows that socrates is mortal (m).
|
| Explivit form of Tribonacci Numbers | 23 Nov 2008 21:23 GMT | 2 |
Hi all. Since I am about holding a talk about Recursion I chose Fibonacci-numbers as a subtopic. I know that there is no explicit form for the nth fibonacci number. Then I wondered whether that applied to Tribonacci- (and n-bonacci-)numbers. I googled and came across the
|
| The negation of 'everything'? | 23 Nov 2008 21:03 GMT | 46 |
The negation of everything poses a problem. For the things it supposes to negate should, by the grammar of negation, present another thing in its place. Yet, we suppose that with the disappearance of anything that could be presented, nothing shall remain. Faced with this impasse, ...
|